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The Solid
MANDELA
The March referendum vote for change was widely 
interpreted as the dawning of a new South Africa. 
Paul Nursey-Bray is more sceptical Blacks may win 
formal equality within the constitution soon. But some 
measure of a democratic civil society is a lot further off.
he removal of the Group Areas Act 
and the Land Acts last year 
eliminated the remaining sig­
nificant pieces of apartheid legisla­
tion from the statute book of South Africa. And 
when a significant majority of the white minority 
endorsed reform in the much-publicised referen- 
dum of March this year, it was widely interpreted 
as confirming the demise of the apartheid sys­
tem, as a prelude to the creation of a democratic 
and multi-racial South Africa. Indeed, the 
euphoric reception that greeted the referendum 
result in the media served to give the impression 
that such a goal had already arrived. Yet, while 
recent events in South Africa have indeed been 
momentous, the task has, in many respects, just 
begun. The path towards a democratic future is
strewn with obstacles that reflect the contradic­
tions and dilemmas of post-apartheid South 
Africa.
In his critique of liberal market society in On the Jewish 
Question, Marx drew attention to the contradictions that 
could exist between the state or political community and 
civil society. He noted that the American constitution had 
eliminated property as a qualification for voting. Within 
the emancipated United States the American citizens were 
free and equal members of a political community that 
united their interests. Yet, as private citizens within the 
civil society they were divided from each other into social 
classes that competed for property and gain. While private 
property, he argued, had been removed as an influence on 
state, it was still the dominant fact of civil society. In like 
manner, while the existence of apartheid has been removed 
from the South African state—apartheid legislation has 
gone and the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa) is negotiating a new political order—the presup­
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positions of apartheid, white supremacy and division on 
racial lines, have not been removed from the civil society 
of South Africa. For democracy to have a chance it is 
essential that these matters be addressed and that the 
conditions for the existence of a democratic civil society be 
created.
U) Education
Most theorists of democracy would argue that an essential 
Part of a democratic civil society is a general and high level 
°f education. Ideally, education should foster both an un­
derstanding of political issues, and thus a rational ap­
proach to political matters, and the spirit of tolerance that 
sustains a democratic consensus. South Africa certainly 
Possesses a more educated and skilled population than 
°ther African countries. This education and skill is a con­
dition and a result of the country's level of urban and 
industrial development. Yet an educational imbalance un­
deniably exists. The educational patterns and past prac­
tices of apartheid have robbed the country of a full 
^alisation of its educational potential.
«  was Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd who set the 
Sidelines for a separate and completely different Bantu 
^ucation system. Verwoerd declared in parliament in
1954 that, "The natives will be taught to realise that 
equality with the Europeans is not for them". There was, 
he went on, "no place for the African in the European 
community above certain forms of labour". The current 
reflection of this policy is the fact that one in every five 
black children has no access to school, while a second is 
expected to drop out during the first two years. At the 
present moment, 50% of South Africa's 30 million black 
population is functionally illiterate. Clearly this is a 
priority issue for the creation of a democratic civil society. 
In February Mandela and De Klerk discussed education 
issues. Subsequently the government agreed to create a 
single, unitary education system for all races. The ANC has 
called for new school buildings in black areas, a program 
to train black teachers and the provision of books and other 
supplies. Of urgent need is more financial support.
(ii) Economic Strategies
Most theorists of modern democracy also agree that 
another precondition for the successful operation of 
democracy is the presence of a certain measure of social 
and economic homogeneity. This is not to argue for ab­
solute equality. It is, however, to argue that the division of 
wealth and social class, of race or ethnic identity, must not 
be so severe as to undermine the consensus that underpins
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the democratic order. As Latin America shows, the exist­
ence of wide disparities of wealth and access to social 
power and amenities can render democracy unworkable 
as a mechanism for securing accord— thus inviting other, 
authoritarian solutions.
White supremacy in South Africa means that the distribu­
tion of wealth, economic control, access to housing, welfare 
and land are hopelessly biased in favour of the white 
population. Although the emergence of an African busi­
ness class and the energetic activities of the Confederation 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have worked to 
redress the balance, the great majority of wealth is still 
owned by whites. All of the major industrial, extractive 
and commercial undertakings are in white hands. Despite 
the end of job reservation and of statutory differentials in 
wage levels, average white wages are still far higher than 
black wages; in 1987 the average non-primary sector white 
wage was 1,959 Rand compared to an average black wage 
of 593 Rand.
Disparities in welfare provision and housing also em­
phasise the wealth gap between black and white. Most 
African township housing is a 'matchbox' of cement block 
construction, with four rooms, and an outside lavatory. For 
the most part electricity is not provided. Figures from the 
mid-1980s show that welfare spending on whites was 
more than double that on an urban black population that 
was four times their number. In the same period one doctor • 
was available for every 330 whites compared to one for 
every 12,000 Africans. Moreover, all of this leaves out of 
account the approximately nine million Africans who live 
in the homelands, whose levels of wealth and welfare 
compare poorly to the relatively privileged urban African 
population.
It is these Africans in the homelands, plus those in other 
rural areas, who have been most affected by the distribu­
tion of land. It is clear that both for the creation of a basis 
for viable democracy, and to secure social justice, some 
means of increasing the wealth of the African majority has 
to be found. Two alternative strategies present themselves: 
a redistribution of wealth that would transfer economic 
control from the whites to the blacks, and a concentration 
on economic growth to produce a surplus for use in ad­
dressing the various social ills.
The Freedom Charter of the ANC of 1955, while cautious 
about a wholehearted commitment to a socialist future, 
proclaimed the need to nationalise key industries in order 
to give an African majority government control of the 
economy and as a way of giving all the people a share in 
the country's wealth. There are still members of the ANC, 
both in the leadership and rank and file, who remain 
committed to such a project. The close alliance between the 
ANC and the South African Communist Party also helps 
to fuel a continued debate about strategies for socialism. 
In the course of the negotiations, however, Nelson Man­
dela has backed away from any commitment to such a 
strategy, progressively diluting proposals for nationalisa­
tion. Some back-pedalling on nationalisation was in­
evitable if only because of the conclusions to be drawn 
from the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the
collapse of the Soviet Union. But Mandela has also been 
led to this position by pragmatic considerations regarding 
the strength of the South African economy and the effect 
upon it of a flight of capital and white skills that would 
follow any radical nationalisation proposals.
Mandela and his advisers have clearly calculated that a 
redistribution strategy could not work on its own. First, the 
size of the South African economy (which is roughly 
equivalent to that of Indonesia or Argentina, with a per 
capita GDP equivalent to Mexico) presents absolute limits 
to what can be done. But it is also an economy which, like 
that of Australia, is in severe recession. This recession is, of 
course, intimately connected with the international rejec­
tion of apartheid, manifest in the sanctions campaign 
(which has now, despite the protests of the ANC, all but 
ended). But the recession is also fuelled by the same factors 
that have led to economic decline in a number of similar 
economies throughout the OECD. In the years 1981-90 
South African GDP grew by only 1%. In 1991 there was a 
fall in GDP of 0.5%. Over the last three years the rate of 
inflation has hovered around 15%; in 1991 it was 16.2%. 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment fell by 5% in 1990 and 
2% in 1991. Unemployment is estimated to be over 30%. It 
is obvious that Mandela's policy options are enormously 
constrained. A crisis of investor confidence that might be 
generated by perceived radical measures could precipitate 
economic collapse.
It is not surprising, then, that Nelson Mandela has been 
increasingly cautious in his approach to the business and 
investment community. In February, Mr Mandela, in sup­
porting the appeals of the South African government for 
investment at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
played down the ANC's approach to nationalisation. The 
ANC, he asserted, envisaged a mixed economy in which 
"the private sector would play a central and critical role to 
ensure the creation of wealth and jobs". The extent of the 
public sector would be "perhaps no different from such 
countries as Germany, France and Italy". On another oc­
casion, Mandela observed that "a future democratic South 
Africa had an obligation to service the debts...incurred by 
the present regime..." In late April this year the ANC issued 
a draft document that dealt with proposed economic 
policies. The document asserted that an ANC-dominated 
government would be guided by the balance of evidence 
rather than by rigid ideologies. "We envisage a dynamic 
private sector," the document declared, "employing the 
skills and acumen of all South Africans, making a major 
contribution to the provision of good-quality, attractive 
and competitively priced goods and services for all." The 
document stressed that everyone should be safeguarded 
against an invasion of property rights, and asserted that 
the strategy to overcome the economic problems be­
queathed by apartheid was a restructuring of the economy 
on the basis of growth.
It is certainly true that the South African economy is both 
poised for, and capable of growth. However, growth in 
itself will not be enough, since it is growth within economic 
structures and parameters that still reflect white 
supremacy. Some restructuring of the economy will be 
crucial to address the issues of redistribution. It is apparent
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that a future ANC administration will have to walk a fine 
line between threats to business confidence that will un­
dermine growth, and a failure to meet the expectations of 
its own constituency that will both cause dissension within 
the party and menace the operation of a democratic system.
‘The government is 
subsidising the continued 
white occupation of land. ’
(iii) Land
Meanwhile the land issue will continue to pose problems 
for the articulation and development of economic 
strategies. The legislation that confined black ownership to 
13% or so of the land has been removed—but that, of 
course, does nothing to remove the status quo of land 
distribution established during the apartheid years. The 
De Klerk government has promised to release for purchase 
400,000 hectares of state-controlled land that was originally 
intended for incorporation into the homelands. But this is 
a drop in the ocean compared to the demands of the many 
millions of Africans previously denied access under the 
Land Acts. Thus far, there has been no indication of any 
intention to restore land to individuals or communities 
who were forced to give up land by apartheid legislation. 
It is estimated that only 2% of the people from whom land 
was taken in the last 30 years will have land provided 
under the present scheme.
Last year, the ANC's Land Commission called for a radical 
program of land reform, involving state intervention to 
secure redistribution, warning that, without it, there would 
be "an outburst of uncontrollable political anger". The 
issue remains unresolved, but it will have to be tackled as 
part of the construction of a consensus within a democratic 
South Africa. The difficulties of the situation have been 
highlighted by the severe drought that is currently grip­
ping Southern Africa. In the Eastern Transvaal, white 
maize farmers have already lost 80-100% of their crops. 
Millions of African subsistence farmers are also threatened, 
as are the 1.3 million African farm workers working on 
white-owned farms. It is an ironic comment on the com­
plexity of the land issue that Pretoria is understood to be 
contemplating drought aid in the order of many hundreds 
°f millions of Rand to help 2,000 to 3,000 white maize 
fanners stay on farms which, the Maize Board estimates, 
they would otherwise be forced to abandon. In the process 
the government is, of course, subsidising the continued 
white occupation of land, an issue the ANC considers a 
Matter of dispute.
0v) A Society Divided
m the creation of a democratic constitution, the political 
division between a white minority and black majority is 
generally seen as the prime issue. This is true, but it should 
e remembered that the black/white division is not the 
only one that will pose problems for a democratic order. 
White supremacy deliberately divided in order to rule, and
the divided character of South African society owes much 
to the policies and laws of apartheid. Certainly it would be 
ingenuous to argue that apartheid was the sole author of 
these divisions. Racial, ethnic and tribal divisions are not 
problems unique to South Africa and would exist inde­
pendently of apartheid. In South Africa, however, they 
were positively encouraged by policies like retribalisation 
and, as the forces of white supremacy continued to or­
chestrate and use them to advantage, they became increas­
ingly entrenched.
Three other key sources of division are the ethnic division 
characterised by the Inkatha/ANC split, the position of the 
ex-homelands, and the existence of large Asian and 
Coloured communities.
The Inkatha movement was founded by King Solomon ka 
Dinizulu in 1922 to preserve Zulu culture. By the 1970s, 
however, it was moribund. It was the initiative of Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975 that revived the movement 
in its modem form. This revival represented a strategy by 
which Buthelezi sought to secure his political base framed 
within the apartheid policies of retribalisation and ethnic 
division. Recruiting almost exclusively from the Zulu 
people, Inkatha rapidly became a powerful organisation, 
one million strong, based in Natal Province. Centred on 
KwaZulu (the intended Zulu homeland under apartheid 
legislation) it became Buthelezi's regional and ethnic 
power base. Decrying apartheid and its structures, and 
refusing to accept apartheid-style 'independence' for Kwa­
Zulu, he sought to appear as a representative of black 
aspirations. At the same time he wooed the whites by 
denouncing the violence of the ANC's guerrilla activities. 
Successive white administrations proved as eager to flirt 
with Buthelezi as he with them.
In the late 1980s the relations between Inkatha and the 
ANC, never good, degenerated into violent hostility. The 
unbanning of the ANC, the release of Mandela, and the 
movement of the ANC and Nationalist government 
towards an accommodation, threatened to deny Buthelezi 
a place in any future discussions about the shape of con­
stitutional arrangements. He reacted in two ways. Inkatha 
supporters conducted increasingly violent campaigns 
within the townships by which they sought to demonstrate 
the political sway of their movement. Then in July 1990 
Inkatha was relaunched as a "non-racial", "centrist" politi­
cal party to lay claim to a political role on the same basis 
as the ANC.
It is clear that Buthelezi's support has never been as large 
as he has claimed. Moreover, as the ANC has long claimed, 
and recent revelations have demonstrated, Inkatha has 
been in constant receipt of clandestine financial and other 
support from South African military intelligence. But the 
divisive factor he represents cannot be overlooked. 
Buthelezi may be a political opportunist, but the fears 
relating to cultural identity and domination that he 
mobilises among the Zulu people, whether justified or not, 
are certainly real.
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While homelands are often dismissed as relics of apartheid, 
they nonetheless represent areas of poverty and need that 
will require special attention. They also continue to house 
political elites whose compliance with, and benefit from, 
apartheid make them potential troublemakers. Lucas Man- 
gope, the leader of BophuthaTswana, is opposed to the 
incorporation of the territory into a new South Africa and 
is seeking a regional deal that will enable him and his 
supporters to hold on to their lucrative positions within the 
ex-homeland. General Oupa Gqozo of the Ciskei (who 
seized power in a coup in 1990 backed by the South African 
Defence Force) is also negotiating for regional autonomy 
and has recently banned the ANC in his territory.
‘A focus on the rights of 
minorities carries special 
implications in South Africa. ’
The separatist threat posed by all of these movements could 
undermine the creation of a unitary democratic state in 
South Africa. The desire of the homeland leaders for 
regional autonomy is matched by Buthelezi's talk of self- 
determination for the Zulu nation which, in turn, har­
monises with the expressed desire of the white Right for a 
separate, all-white, Boer state. Recent reports suggest that 
contacts exist between the forces of white conservatism, 
Buthelezi and the homeland leaders, the aim being some 
form of what the Conservative Party's Andries Treumicht 
has called a "commonwealth of nations" within South 
Africa. Although any extreme separatist political options 
are unlikely to triumph against the combined forces of the 
ANC and the Nationalist government, the divisive forces 
that the various parties represent will continue to be a 
problem for a future democratic consensus. They are al­
ready being used by De Klerk in negotiations with the ANC 
to secure entrenched local or regional rights for white 
communities.
One other potential source of social division which should 
not be overlooked is the existence of the large Asian and 
Coloured communities, numbering 950,000 and 3.2 million 
respectively. This combined total is only a little short of that 
of the white population. Yet so far they have not figured 
largely in the discussions. Partly this is the result of their 
recent history. In the 1984 constitution each group was 
given its own house of representatives in the tri-cameral 
legislature. In fact, the effort to incorporate the two groups 
within the white power structure largely failed, and was 
opposed by many members of both communities. Never­
theless, as a divisive tactic it did create some fear of domina­
tion by the black majority, and this will have to be faced 
within the context of a democratic civil society. Recent 
reports suggest that township violence is channelling 
Asian and Coloured support to the Nationalist Party.
(v) The Constitution
The task of designing a democratic constitution for South 
Africa is, to say the least, daunting. While a transition to 
majority rule has been accepted in broad outline, negotia­
tions continue about safeguards to protect minority rights 
(and, specifically, the rights of the white minority) after a 
transfer of power. It is clear that the subtext to these negotia­
tions is the maintenance of white supremacy. A paper 
released by the Nationalist Party in March, in advance of 
the referendum, promised whites a number of safeguards, 
including constraints on the power of future presidents; the 
supremacy of the constitution rather than parliament; im­
partial and professional control over the security forces; 
devolution of real power to regional and local govern­
ments; entrenchment of the principles of a market economy 
in the constitution; a Charter of Fundamental Rights that 
would, inter alia, protect property rights to cars, houses, 
pensions and businesses.
The ANCs constitutional blueprint, issued in the same 
period, made a number of concessions on this score. There 
was a commitment in principle to strong regional govern­
ment, to an interim government being based on a consen­
sus requiring a two-thirds majority for parliamentary 
legislation, and to the idea of built-in consensus, with white 
powers of veto for five years in the first one-person one- 
vote government. Current negotiations focus on the com­
position and decision-making power of the proposed 
Constituent Assembly to formulate the new constitution, 
and of the elected Transitional Government. Other areas of 
dispute include the transfer of presidential power and the 
so-called 'sunset clauses' which will ensure the agreed 
consensus (that is, white veto power) in the first years of an 
African majority government. Tough negotiations are 
ahead.
The new democratic constitution of South Africa will seek 
to preserve minority rights while assuring majority rule, as 
all good liberal-democratic constitutions should. The 
peculiar conditions of South Africa make this a particularly 
difficult exercise. A focus on the rights of the minorities 
carries special implications in South Africa, where special 
rights for the white minority hint at continuing white 
supremacy. There is a temptation for the majority to be­
come, in return, more assertive. It will require a sense of 
balance to achieve a harmony between minority rights and 
majority rule without conceding undue power to white 
supremacist demands.
In any case, whatever the nature of the constitution that 
emerges from the current negotiations, the success of 
democracy in South Africa will depend not on constitution­
al niceties but on the success with which a stable and 
democratic civil society can be created—one that enshrines 
consensus and secures the rights of minorities, not by 
constitutional safeguards, but by civil agreements and 
mutual tolerance. On this score the struggle has only just 
begun.
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